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ABSTRACT
Machine learning has been widely applied to various applications,
some of which involve training with privacy-sensitive data. A mod-
est number of data breaches have been studied, including credit
card information in natural language data and identities from face
dataset. However, most of these studies focus on supervised learning
models. As deep reinforcement learning (DRL) has been deployed
in a number of real-world systems, such as indoor robot navigation,
whether trained DRL policies can leak private information requires
in-depth study. To explore such privacy breaches in general, we
mainly propose two methods: environment dynamics search via ge-
netic algorithm and candidate inference based on shadow policies.
We conduct extensive experiments to demonstrate such privacy
vulnerabilities in DRL under various settings. We leverage the pro-
posed algorithms to infer floor plans from some trained Grid World
navigation DRL agents with LiDAR perception. The proposed al-
gorithm can correctly infer most of the floor plans and reaches
an average recovery rate of 95.83% using policy gradient trained
agents. In addition, we are able to recover the robot configuration
in continuous control environments and an autonomous driving
simulator with high accuracy. To the best of our knowledge, this is
the first work to investigate privacy leakage in DRL settings and we
show that DRL-based agents do potentially leak privacy-sensitive
information from the trained policies.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Recently, the machine learning field has witnessed significant pro-
gresses on image recognition [8], natural language processing [29],
∗ Indicates equal contribution.
Proc. of the 18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
(AAMAS 2019), N. Agmon, M. E. Taylor, E. Elkind, M. Veloso (eds.), May 13–17, 2019,
Montreal, Canada. © 2019 International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and
Multiagent Systems (www.ifaamas.org). All rights reserved.
Figure 1: Overfitting in Grid World environment. Grid
Worldmap (left), agent’s trained policy (middle), agent’s pol-
icy when obstacles are removed (right). The agent “mem-
orizes” the original environment and the optimal actions
even when the environment has been changed, indicating
that the original environment transition dynamics can be
potentially inferred by approximating the optimal policy.
and robotic control [13]. However, recently machine learning algo-
rithms have been found possible to leak private information of indi-
vidual training data [25]. The private information could be personal
health data, transaction history or personal photos which contain
sensitive information. For example, in the black-box membership in-
ference attack setting, it is possible to determine if some individual
data points were used to train the model with only black-box access
to it [25]. This fact indicates that personal private information may
be leaked from the trained machine learning models.
The goal of our work is to explore if similar issues occur in rein-
forcement learning (RL), especially in deep reinforcement learning
(DRL). Deep reinforcement learning has recently achieved great
successes in solving computer games [15], robotic control tasks
[13], and autonomous driving [7, 17]. Since DRL has a great po-
tential to be applied in many real world applications which may
involve personal private data in the trained model, therefore it is
important to study the vulnerability of deep reinforcement learning
to potential privacy-stealing attacks. However, existing work on
privacy in machine learning are mostly about supervised learning
models such as classification and regression models. The privacy
issue in reinforcement learning algorithms has not been studied
before.
We present a motivating example that demonstrates the possi-
bility of private information leakage from a DRL policy, followed
by discussions on attack strategies. In a simple Grid World envi-
ronment, the agent’s task is to navigate from its current location to
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the goal location and avoid colliding with obstacles. In Figure 1, the
gray boxes represent obstacles, the red box denotes the agent, and
the green box shows the goal of the agent. A trained reinforcement
learning policy using DQN [15] with vision input (the aerial view
of the Grid World) follows the trajectory indicated by the red line
towards the goal. Surprisingly, based on our observation, the agent
follows the same trajectory even when we remove all obstacles
within the frame of the Grid World. In this example, the trained
policy will reveal the optimal actions on the original map without
seeing the same map, and therefore leak the private information
within the original GridWorld. The explanation for this observation
is that the DQN agent “memorizes” the training map instead of
acquiring the ability to perform visual navigation. Furthermore, this
information can be used to infer the map structure given that we
know the optimal action at every location. This motivating example
shows that it is possible to infer private information from a trained
deep reinforcement learning policy.
Different from the case in supervised learning, we define the
problem of stealing private information from DRL policies as infer-
ring certain sensitive characteristics of the training environment
transition dynamics given black-box access to the trained policy.
We assume a powerful attacker with access to certain components
of the environment including the state space, the action space, the
initial state distribution and the reward function, in order to ana-
lyze the worst case scenario. Notably, such a problem of inferring
transition dynamics is itself an ill-posed problem. Similar to in-
verse reinforcement learning [2] in which more than one reward
functions can explain the observed behaviors; in our setting, it is
possible that more than one transition dynamics can explain the
given black-box policy. As a result, in general it is not possible to in-
fer the exact transition dynamics from the given policy. Rather, we
study it as a private information leaking problem in the following
two settings: first, the attacker knows nothing about the training
environments but the environments can have common constraints;
second, the attacker has access to a set of potential candidates of
environment dynamics.
In both settings, we consider the black-box scenario which only
allows us to query the policy but not the policy parameters. In the
first setting, the attackers are aware of a set of explicit constraints
about the transition dynamics and try to infer the transition dynam-
ics. For instance, in the Grid World game, the attacker knows that
one action can only move at most 1 step away from any location. In
the second setting, the attacker is provided with a set of candidate
robot configurations in robotic control tasks along with the trained
policy in one unknown configuration, and the goal is to infer which
configuration was used to perform the training. Such setting is mo-
tivated by the practical scenario where different robotic systems are
provided in the market for further verification. Thus, by inferring
the actual dynamic configuration from these accessible candidates,
it is possible to tell where the robot was made or other information
about the robot. If the policy for a specific robot is hacked this way,
it is possible for an attacker to infer the specific configuration of
the robot and pose a great threat to the system’s privacy. In this
setting, our attack trains separate shadow policies under each of the
available configurations and uses the performance on all candidate
environments to train a classifier to figure out which configuration
corresponds to which policy.
Our contributions are listed as follows.
• To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work to conduct
studies on the privacy leakage problem in DRL;
• We formulate the problem with goal of inferring environ-
ment dynamics under different scenarios, including when
the attacker has limited knowledge about the training envi-
ronments and when the attacker having access to a set of
possible candidates of the training environment dynamics;
• We propose two algorithms to perform the privacy attacks in
DRL: approximate the optimal policy via genetic algorithm,
and candidate inference via shadow policies;
• We perform comprehensive privacy analysis in DRL within
several environments: navigation task with LiDAR percep-
tion as input, robots in continuous control environments,
and autonomous driving simulator. We show that we can
obtain high recovery rate in different scenarios.
2 RELATEDWORK
Sensitivity ofRLonTrainingEnvironments. It has been shown
in previous work that RL policy training is highly sensitive to train-
ing hyper-parameters, and slight variation of these parameters can
lead to significantly different results [9]. RL is also known to have
a hard time generalizing to an unseen domain [28] and typically
overfits to the original training environment, though adding ran-
domization during training helps improve the robustness of RL
algorithms to a limited extent [19]. These characteristics indicate
that RL models may have implicitly memorized the training en-
vironment and are vulnerable to attacks that try to steal private
training environment information.
Robust RL and Transfer Learning. Previous work in robust
RL seeks to train an RL policy that can work in different environ-
ments with varying dynamics or visual scenes [12, 16, 18, 19, 21].
Policies trained in multiple environments have better generaliza-
tion to an unseen target domain compared with policies that are
only trained in one environment [19]. Intuitively, RL models that
can generalize well to different environments may also tend to have
better robustness against privacy leaking attacks.
Privacy-Stealing Attack Against Machine Learning Mod-
els. Membership inference attacks on machine learning models
have been previously studied by [25] and further studied by [4, 26].
The attack is performed on the trained models to tell whether or
not a specific data point is in the training set. On the defense side,
differential privacy for machine learning algorithms protecting
training data has also been been framed and studied by [1, 24].
However, most of the works on both sides focus on classification
models, where the data are collected offline for training. In the
reinforcement learning setting, the data are collected online during
training, and inference about whether a single data point is used to
train the model is not applicable. Instead, in this paper, we propose
to infer the environment transition dynamics. One related work is
privacy preserving reinforcement learning by [22]. However, their
work is in a multi-agent reinforcement learning setting, and the
private information refers to privacy between individual agent’s
knowledge instead of the actual training data privacy discussed in
this work.
InverseReinforcement Learning. Inverse reinforcement learn-
ing is about inferring the reward function given expert demon-
strations [2, 31]. In our case, we are given access to a black-box
well-trained reinforcement learning policy, and the task is to infer
the most likely dynamics coefficients or the environment transition
dynamics. Our work is also related with the work by [10]. However,
this work assumes that experience data in the original environment
are given, while in our case we do not have this assumption.
3 PRIVACY-LEAKAGE ATTACK ON DEEP
REINFORCEMENT LEARNING
In this section, we first formulate our problem under the reinforce-
ment learning setting and then propose algorithms to infer private
information about the RL training environment.
3.1 Problem Definition
We follow the formulation of the standard reinforcement learning
problem. The environment of reinforcement learning is modeled
as a Markov Decision Process (MDP), which consists of the state
space S, the action space A, the transition dynamics T , and the
reward function R. Usually a discount factor γ will be applied to
the accumulated reward to discount future rewards. The transition
dynamics is defined as a probability mapping from state-action pairs
to states T : (S × A) × S → [0, 1]. The goal of a reinforcement
learning algorithm is to learn a policy π that maps state-action pairs
to a probability distributionπ : S × A → [0, 1], so as to maximize
the expected return Eπ [∑H−1t=0 γ t rt ], where H is the length of the
horizon.
In this work, we are interested in the problem of inferring the
transition dynamics T of an MDP given a well trained policy π
and other components of that MDP. Recovering the transition prob-
ability T is a fundamentally ill-posed problem. There could be
multiple T s that can explain the same observed policy. Therefore,
we further assume the attacker has access to prior knowledge of
some structural constraints about the environment. Specifically,
we consider the following two scenarios. In the first scenario, we
assume the attacker has knowledge of some explicit constraints on
T . The attacker tries to find a T that both satisfies the constraints
and best explains the observed policy. In the second scenario, we
assume the attacker knows a set of candidate T s. The goal of the
attacker is to determine which one of the candidates is the original
transition dynamics used for training.
3.2 Methodology
In this section, we introduce two methods that respectively solve
the two problems defined above.
3.2.1 Transition Dynamics Search by Genetic Algorithm. For the
first scenario, we formulate the problem as searching for a T that
both satisfies certain constraints and best explains the observed
policy. We propose to solve such a problem with a Genetic Algo-
rithm (GA). GA is a kind of search algorithm inspired by the process
of natural selection [5, 27]. Different GAs are proposed based on
different bio-inspired mutation and selection operators [6, 11]. In
this paper, we use the basic GA to demonstrate the possibility of
attack. However, our goal is not to show that GA is the only and
the best method to solve the problem.
In each iteration, we maintain a population of transition dynam-
ics {T } that satisfy the known constraints. We have the following
fitness score (Equation 1) to characterize how similar the induced
optimal policy π∗T by any T is to the given policy πtarget.
Score(π∗T ;πtarget) =
∑
s ∈SE
∆(πtarget(s),π∗T (s)), (1)
where SE is the state space of the environment E, and π∗T is the
optimal policy under environment E with transition dynamics T .
Here ∆ is a similarity metric on the action space and π∗T refers
to the optimal policy we independently obtained by training with
candidate transition dynamics T . The goal is to find a T such that it
maximizes this similarity score. Top n candidates (elite population)
sorted by the fitness (similarity) score are kept to the next gener-
ation. Other candidates are generated by two candidates (called
parents) of the last generation. Our GA variant selects parents by
randomly selecting two candidates and choosing the one with the
higher score. Then a two-point crossover of the selected parents is
used to generate their child candidates. Also, random mutation is
applied to the child candidates. A detailed description of our GA is
in Algorithm 1. By running such a GA algorithm, we aim to find a
Tout that is close to the original transition dynamics that induces
the provided policy πtarget.
Algorithm1Genetic Algorithm for Transition Dynamics Recovery
Input:
πtarget: The provided policy
C: The constraint for transition dynamics
Score: The fitness score function
L: Size of the population
n: Size of the elite population
G: Generation limit
Output:
Tout: Best transition dynamics solution found
{T }0 := randomly generated L candidates satisfying C
for i in 0 to G − 1 do
{T }i := sort {T }i according to the Score(π∗T ;πtarget){T }i+1 := first n candidates in {T }i
while Ti+1 is not filled up do
T1, T2 := randomly select 2 candidates in {T }i
parent1 := max(T1, T2) according to their score
T1, T2 := randomly select 2 candidates in {T }i
parent2 := max(T1, T2) according to their score
Tnew := Crossover(parent1, parent2)
Tnew := Mutation(Tnew)
if Tnew satisfies C then
Ti+1 = Ti+1 ∪ (Tnew)
end if
end while
end for
return Tout: the candidate with the highest score in {T }G
3.2.2 Candidate Inference with Shadow Policies. For the second
scenario, we present an algorithm to perform candidate environ-
ment dynamics inference. Since the policy tends to behave differ-
ently in environments with perturbed transition dynamics, we use
the given policy’s performances under all candidate environments
to infer which candidate it was trained on. To build a classification
model, we first construct the training dataset by training N ×m
shadow policies under N environment dynamics, each of which
is initialized with m random seeds. The policy π ji is the jth pol-
icy trained on the corresponding candidate transition dynamics
Ti , where i ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,N }, j ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,m}. Then for each of the
N ×m policies, we collect their episodic rewards under N different
environment dynamics with k trials for each. We construct the
feature vectors for each policy using the mean and variance of
the episodic rewards over k trials in every environment dynamics.
Thus, the feature vector for each policy will be a vector in R2N .
We then fit a classifier based on the feature vectors with labels
corresponding to each environment dynamics candidate. During
testing time, given a target policy πtarget, we build the feature vec-
tor in a similar way: calculate the episodic reward in each of the
N dynamics with k different trials, and therefore predict which
environment dynamics it was originally trained on. The detailed
algorithm is described in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Candidate Inference with Shadow Policies
Prepare Training Data
Learn N ×m shadow policies {π }mN under {T }N ; D = {}
for π ji ∈ {π }mN do
D[π ji ] = ∅
for T ∈ {T }N do
R(π ji ): obtain k trials’ episodic reward of policy π
j
i in T
D[π ji ] = D[π
j
i ]∪ mean and variance of R(π
j
i )
end for
end for
Got data pairs: rewards and dynamics label {(D[π ji ], i)}
j=1:m
i=1:N .
Learn Classifier
Learn a classifier c : D[π ji ] → i .
Test: Apply classifier c on target policy πtarget.
3.3 Relation to Inverse RL
Our defined problem is related to inverse RL. For an MDP tuple
(S, A, T ,R, γ ), normal RL assumes that all 4 items are available
and learns an optimal policy π to maximize the expected return.
Inverse RL (IRL) assumes that only (S, A, T , γ ) are available. It
infers R given optimal policy π from expert demonstrations. RL
seeks to learn the optimal policy given a reward function R, while
IRL learns the reward function R that best supports the given policy
π . Different from IRL and RL, our proposed transition dynamics
recovery problem assumes that only (S, A, R, γ ) are available. It
infers T given some optimal policy π . Our work studies how to
infer the transition dynamics T that best supports the given policy
π .
Figure 2: An example of our abstracted grid map. (a) The
original real floor plan. (b) The abstracted grid map.
4 WHAT MAP DID YOUWALK ON?
In this experiment section, we present an example showing how
an attacker could inversely acquire private information (the floor
plan in a Grid World environment) with GA algorithm under the
first scenario we defined previously.
4.1 Experimental Settings
Performing navigation on a certain map is a fundamental problem
in robotics. Recent studies try to address this problem in an end-to-
end manner by using Deep Reinforcement Learning (DRL) based
algorithms [14, 30]. As the Grid World is a very commonly used
environment for testing RL algorithms, and a reasonable simplifi-
cation of the navigation task, the experiments in this section are
based on the Grid World environments.
We are interested in the problem that given a well-trained DRL
agent on some specific grid map, can we recover the map (or at
least part of the map)? This kind of attack can pose a real threat
to the practical use of RL agents, if the attacker can easily infer
the floor plan structures of privacy-sensitive areas by just having
access to the navigation robots’ learned policy. We introduce the
following setup to approximate the case of a navigation robot in the
real world. More specifically, the grid maps are designed similarly
to real floor plans. An example is presented in Figure 2.
We consider the case that the agent takes LiDAR as input instead
of aerial-view visual data. More specifically, the observation space
is composed of distances in positive real value in 8 directions (4
cardinal directions and 4 intermediate directions). The action space
contains five actions: move left, move right, move up, move down
and stay. The reward function is defined as 1 if reaching the goal,
and -0.1 if the agent stays in place or collides with obstacles, and 0
otherwise. The goal location is fixed for each grid map. RL agents
are trained until full convergence on the environment before testing.
The detailedmap constraints and policy training details are included
below.
Floor Plan Constraints. All grid maps are designed following
some common sense in real world architecture design. In particular,
anH×W floor plan, together with its boundary walls, should satisfy
the following constraints: First, free space (including the goal) grids
form a connected graph, which means the smallest navigation
distance between any two free space grids is finite; Second, there
should be one and only one goal position on the grid map, and the
goal grid is considered as free space, not an obstacle; Third, the
Figure 3: (a) The ground truthmap. (b, c) Two search results recovered from deterministic agent (DQN). (d, e) Two search results
recovered from stochastic agent (Policy Gradient, PG). Cells mismatched with the ground truth are marked with red crosses.
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Figure 4: Curves of fitness score in the 8 GA search runswith
DQN agents. Different colors indicate different seeds. The x-
axis indicates the number of GA iterations. (a) The curve of
population average score. (b) The curve of population aver-
age recovery rate (accuracy of free space or obstacle predic-
tion).
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Figure 5: Curves of fitness score in the 8 GA search runswith
Policy Gradient (PG) agents. Different colors indicate differ-
ent seeds. The x-axis indicates the number of GA iterations.
(a) The curve of population average score. (b) The curve of
population average recovery rate.
thickness of walls must be equal to 1. In other words, there should
not be any obstacles of shape 2× 2, or any obstacles containing this
shape. Note that the boundary walls are not considered as part of
the map, and are considered as a known prior. An example floor
plan is shown in Figure 2.
Policy Training Details. The target policies under a set of spe-
cific floor plan designs are trained using DQN [15]. The policy
network structure is shown in Table 1. We train the agents using
the aforementioned reward design. For using DQN, we train the
agents using an epsilon-greedy exploration schedule with explo-
ration rate decreasing from 1 to 0.02 from step 0 to step 100,000.
We also train agents with vanilla policy gradient methods to get
stochastic policies. The policy gradient agents share the same net-
work architecture, the same environment reward functions, and
the same exploration schedule with DQN.
Table 1: Architecture of network used for LiDAR input
agents. ReLU activation are applied after each linear layer
except the last one.
Type Input Dim. Output Dim.
Linear 8 64
Linear 64 64
Linear 64 5
4.2 Attack Implementation
Under this setting, we implement the GA based search method
to recover the map structure. We randomly generate 20 test floor
plans of size 7 × 7 according to the constraints mentioned earlier.
For DQN, the fitness score (similarity score) measures the fitness
of a grid map’s transition dynamics T to a given policy πtarget.
The similarity metric ∆ for deterministic policy (DQN) is 0 if the
action selections disagree between the target policy and current
policy and it’s 1 if they agree; for stochastic policies with the policy
gradient method (PG), we use the L2 distance between their action
probability distribution, and we set a threshold ϵ = 0.02 such that
if the action probability distribution’s L2 distance between the
two policies is smaller than ϵ , then the similarity metric returns 1,
otherwise it returns 0. Therefore maximizing the score is equivalent
to minimizing the policy difference.
Genetic Algorithm Details. In our GA variant, a population P
size L is evolved iteratively. The population is composed of candi-
date map solutionsmi , represented by a 0-1 vector (0 for empty and
1 for wall). At every iteration (called generation), eachmi is eval-
uated using Equation 1, produces a fitness score Fi , and is sorted
according to the score. The top n candidates (elite population) are
kept to the next generation. The other candidates are each gener-
ated by two candidates (called parents) of the last generation. Our
GA variant selects parents by randomly selecting two candidates
and choosing the one with higher score. Then a two-point crossover
of the selected parents is used to generate their child candidate.
Random mutation is applied to the resulting child candidate with
a mutation rate β . The operators used in our GA variant include:
𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡'
𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡( 𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑1 1 1
111
1 1 1 1
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0
𝑎 𝑏
𝑎 𝑏
Figure 6: An example of two-point crossover.
First, crossover operator. We use two-point crossover in our imple-
mentation. For the two-point crossover on vectors of length l , two
random crossover positions a,b (0 ≤ a ≤ b ≤ l) are generated for
each parent pair. The resulting child candidate is a combination of
parent1[0, a), parent2[a, b) parent1[b, END]. This process is shown
in Figure 6. Second, mutation operator. We preset a fixed mutation
rate β (in our experiments, set to 0.05). For each child vector gener-
ated by the crossover process, all bits within their vector have the
chance to flip with probability β .
Based on the fitness scores defined previously, we implement
the introduced GA search method. As previous papers have shown
that GA tends to converge to a local minimum [20], we run the
proposed GA search multiple times with 8 different random seeds.
The highest-scored one is selected as our final search result. In
addition, we compare GA search with two baseline search methods
including random search and RL-based search.
Random Search: The most direct method that can be applied
here is random search. In each search iteration, we randomly gen-
erate a grid map and calculate its score according to Equation 1,
and consider the map with the highest score as our solution. While
there is no guarantee that random search will find a solution, a time
limit (5000 s) is set for the search algorithm.
RL-based Search: Reinforcement learning has recently been
used to solve combinatorial optimization problems and search prob-
lems [3]. Here we use reinforcement learning as a baseline to search
for a Grid World map. The MDP for RL is defined as such: the state
space is all the possible map configurations; the action space is
discrete, and consists of overall H ×W actions for a map of H ×W
shape; the reward function is defined the same as in GA algorithm’s
fitness score; the terminal condition is when the number of episodic
step exceeds 100 steps. We use DQN as the reinforcement learning
search algorithm and use epsilon-greedy policy for exploration.
More specifically, for the testing maps of 7 × 7 size, the input to
the DQN network is a 49 dimension binary vector representing
the current guessed map, and the outputs are the Q-values of 49
different actions, where each action indicates that specific location
to be changed from obstacle to free space or from free space to
obstacle. The goal position will not change and it’s considered to
be known as prior information. The RL algorithm runs for 250,000
steps before terminating, and the exploration rate decays linearly
from 1 to 0.02 from step 0 to step 240,000. The running time is also
set to be 5000 s. We use a three layer fully connected deep neural
network to train this RL based search method, with each layer’s
output size to be 64 except the last layer’s output size, which is 49.
Table 2 summarizes the accuracy of floor plan recovery by differ-
ent methods (the best recovery rate). As we can see, with a similar
running time, the GA based search method outperforms the other
two methods and achieves high accuracy in terms of map structure
recovery. Therefore, our attack method is able to recover the map
structure and poses a great threat to the privacy of DRL.
To have a better understanding of the GA results, we take the
floor plan in Figure 2 for example. Figure 3 is the visualization of the
final search results from the GA algorithm. The curves of population
average score and average recovery rate are plotted in Figure 4 and
Figure 5. As can be seen, the quality of the recovered maps from
the policy gradient (PG) agent are significantly better than those
from the DQN agent. This is intuitive because the former agent
gives much more information than the latter one. It is easier to
tell if an agent has been trained on some states with the complete
probability information. If we compare the curves of two cases
(DQN vs PG), we can see the population average score from DQN
is higher and more concentrated than from PG, but all runs of DQN
agents show a lower average recovery rate (approximately 70%),
while some runs of PG agents could reach recovery rate higher
than 90%. This is due in part to the score function used for PG.
In DQN, the score function only carries binary information (the
same selected action or different actions), while in PG, the whole
action probability distribution is compared, which provides more
information about the uncertainty in action selection.
5 WHICH BOT DID YOU USE?
In this section, we present results showing how an attacker could in-
versely acquire private information using candidate inference with
shadow policies under the second scenario we defined previously.
The hypothetical attack scenario happens when an attacker tries to
identify which version of the robot was used based on the released
policy. We conduct the experiments on a suite of continuous control
benchmarks including the RoboSchool version of MuJoCo tasks
Hopper and Half-Cheetah, Box2D environment bipedal walker, and
TORCS, a car racing simulator.
Hopper. The hopper is a monopod robot with four links cor-
responding to the torso, thigh, shin, and foot and three actuated
joints. The goal for the robot is to learn to walk on a plane without
falling over by applying continuous-valued forces to its joints. The
reward at each time step is a combination of the progress made
and the costs of the movements, e.g. electricity, and penalties for
collisions. Three environment parameters can be varied: 1. torso
density 2. sliding friction of the joints 3. power of the forces applied
to each joint. We construct 6 candidate configuration by alternat-
ing these parameters. Namely, they are ‘LightTorso’, ‘HeavyTorso’,
‘SlipperyJoints’,‘RoughJoints’,‘Weak’ and ‘Strong’.
Half Cheetah. Half-cheetah is a bipedal robot with eight links
and six actuated joints corresponding to the thighs, shins, and feet.
The goal, reward structure, parameters and the way we construct
candidate configurations are the same as those in Hopper.
Bipedal Walker. Bipedal Walker is a bipedal robot. The task is
to move to the far end, and the agent gets a reward if it succeeds.
The state space consists of the hull angle speed, angular velocity,
horizontal speed, vertical speed, position of joints and joint angular
speeds, legs contact with ground, and 10 LiDAR rangefinder mea-
surements. We construct 9 candidate configurations by changing
the value of the hull angle speed.
Table 2: Map recovery rate and candidate inference accuracy.
Environment Agent Task Method Recovery Rate Run Time (s)
Grid World DQN Transition Dynamics Search Random Search 61.31% 5000
Grid World DQN Transition Dynamics Search RL-based Search 81.63% 5000
Grid World DQN Transition Dynamics Search Genetic Algorithm 89.55% 4511
Grid World PG Transition Dynamics Search Random Search 68.55% 5000
Grid World PG Transition Dynamics Search RL-based Search 71.42% 5000
Grid World PG Transition Dynamics Search Genetic Algorithm 95.83% 4063
Hopper PPO Candidate Inference SVM 81.30% -
Half Cheetah PPO Candidate Inference SVM 82.30% -
Bipedal Walker PPO Candidate Inference SVM 88.90% -
TORCS DQN Candidate Inference SVM 94.30% -
TORCS. TORCS is an open-source car racing simulator con-
taining multiple categories of environments with different road
conditions and terrain. We use the Michigan Way environment,
which is a racing road with sunny weather. The simulator comes
from themodified TORCS simulator from [17]. Reinforcement learn-
ing models trained on TORCS get input as RGB images from the
simulator and can execute 9 different actions, including move for-
ward and keep current speed, move forward and accelerate, move
forward and decelerate, turn left and keep current speed, turn left
and accelerate, turn left and decelerate, turn right and keep current
speed, turn right and accelerate, turn right and decelerate. The re-
ward function is defined as s ∗ (cosθ − | sinθ |)/40 when there is no
collision, and -2.5 when there are collisions, where s is the current
speed of the car, and θ is the angle between the speed direction
and road direction. The game terminates when the number of steps
exceeds 1000 or when the the car collides into obstacles 3 times.
We construct 5 configurations with different surface friction coef-
ficients of the road, side walk, and fences. We change the friction
of the surfaces from very slippery to slippery to normal, then to
rough and very rough.
Figure 7: Hopper and Half-Cheetah environments.
Figure 8: Bipedal Walker and TORCS environments.
Note that the parameters involved in constructing candidate en-
vironments are important private information. For example, in the
TORCS environment, the surface friction coefficients can help to
infer the material used to construct the road or indoor environment.
Hypothetical attackers can use such information to potentially
know more about the background of the autonomous driving envi-
ronment. The road’s friction coefficient can also reflect the weather
conditions where the policy is trained.
For Hopper and Half-Cheetah environments, we use Proximal
Policy Optimization (PPO) algorithm [23] to train policies. For
each dynamics configuration, we train for 10,000 episodes until
convergence. For bipedal walker, we use PPO to train policy on each
configuration for 3,000 episodes until convergence. While training
the PPO policy, we use a random environment seed for each episode
to avoid overfitting to the seed. The policy and value functions are
multi-layer perceptrons (MLPs) with two hidden layers of 64 units
each and hyperbolic tangent activations; there is no parameter
sharing.
For the TORCS environment, we use DQN to train the policy to
be attacked. For all configurations, we train for one million steps
with exploration rate decaying from 1 to 0.02 from step 0 to step
500,000, and keep the exploration rate at 0.02 from 500,000 steps
on. The DQN network consists of 2 convolutional layers and 3 fully
connected layers, and the input image size is 256 × 256 × 3. The
network architecture is included in Table 3.
Table 3: Architecture of network used for training TORCS.
ReLU activations are applied after each linear or convolu-
tional layer except the last linear layer.
Type Kernel Stride Output Channels
Conv. 8 4 32
Conv. 4 2 64
Conv. 3 1 64
Linear - - 512
Linear - - 9
For each configuration, we train policies with 32 random seeds
on the training algorithms, splitting the different seeds into training
and testing datasets. Out of the policies under 32 seeds, 8 of them
were used to generate the training samples to learn the classifiers
and the rest were used to do evaluation. The accuracy is computed
Figure 9: TORCS dynamics candidate testing performance.
Figure 10: Hopper and Half-Cheetah candidate inference ac-
curacy for different candidates.
by averaging accuracy over all configurations. For each task, we
have N different candidate dynamics, and N varies across different
tasks. For Hopper and Half-Cheetah, we have 6 candidates, and for
Bipedal Walker we have 9, for TORCS, we have 5. We use a linear
support vector machine (SVM) classifier to predict the label for a
given policy.
In Figure 9, we show the test time performance of models trained
in different dynamics in the TORCS environment. It shows that
changing the dynamics does change the model’s performance in
different testing environments. This makes it possible for a SVM
classifier to identify the candidate label for a given policy. Mean-
while, the policy does have some generalization ability. Take the
policy trained on normal environment for example: it has the same
performance on normal, rough and very rough roads. This indicates
that the environment where the policy performs the best may not
be exactly the environment where it was trained on. On the other
hand, Table 2 shows that a trained SVM classifier can identify the
pattern of performances for each policy, and use this to figure out
where each policy was trained.
In Figure 10, we present the accuracy of identifying the under-
lying training candidate in both the Hopper and Half Cheetah
environments. It shows that some candidates are easier to identify
than others. Interestingly, this pattern is shared between Hopper
and Half Cheetah.
We report our candidate inference accuracy in table 2 for all
environments. Given the policy rollout performance in all envi-
ronments with different dynamics, we classify this policy into the
environment where it was originally trained. It illustrates that using
the candidate inference with shadow polices method, we achieve
high accuracy across all environments. It would be possible for an
attacker to inversely infer which candidate configuration was used
to train the given policy. This potentially poses a privacy-leaking
challenge to existing reinforcement learning algorithms such as
PPO and DQN.
We discuss designing deep reinforcement learning policies that
are robust to such privacy-leaking attacks. As mentioned in the
related works section, robust reinforcement learning usually means
training policies that can generalize to slightly perturbed envi-
ronments. The purpose is to train policies that can be robust to
perturbation in the environment to ensure safety in control. Our
work indicates that if trained RL policies can generalize to perturbed
environments, the policies may also be robust to privacy-leaking
attacks. For example, in the Grid World case, if the policy is not
memorizing the environment dynamics but instead learns to plan no
matter what environment it is deployed in, then it would be almost
impossible to infer the floor plan structure using our method. In the
candidate inference method, if the trained policies can generalize
to many different environments, including significantly perturbed
environments, then it will be much harder to infer which environ-
ment appeared in the training environment. Therefore, our work
provides some insight into designing robust RL algorithms that can
defend against such privacy-leaking attacks.
6 CONCLUSION
In this work, we have evaluated several approaches to retrieve pri-
vate information about the environment from well-trained policies
under different settings. We evaluated our proposed algorithms
under two settings. In the first setting we apply some constraints
on the transition dynamics, and proposed to use a genetic algorithm
to recover the original transition map in a Grid World environment.
In the second setting, we assume we have access to several candi-
date dynamics and propose an algorithm to infer which candidate
environment is used to train a given policy. Through extensive ex-
periments we show that deep reinforcement learning is vulnerable
to potential privacy-leaking attacks and specific information about
the training environment dynamics can be recovered with high ac-
curacy. These findings provide insights for designing reinforcement
learning algorithms that protect the training environment’s privacy.
Our work also provides reinforcement learning community with a
new perspective at the intersection of RL and its generalizability,
privacy and security.
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